In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition there is (almost always) no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates where the distribution of voters' preferred policies are single-peaked. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platform), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of single-peaked distributions. In addition, equilibria have the following features: (i) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (ii) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; (iii) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.
Introduction
The Hotelling-Downs model of political competition is the workhorse of political scientists and political economists. A classical result is that candidates' incentives to maximize their vote share will lead them to converge on the median voter's preferred platform in the unique equilibrium with N = 2 candidates. In the model, strategic candidates do not choose extreme positions because it would render them unelectable. Furthermore, Osborne (1993) shows that in general when N > 2, equilibria do not exist. However, many political races feature multiple candidates with distinct policy positions i.e., there often exist distinct, extreme (left-most and right-most) candidates. In many countries, candidates near the ends of the political spectrum exist and run in elections, even when it is unlikely they will win. Even when one considers more mainstream parties, recent research suggests that the presence of extreme candidates within them may be "due in significant part to candidates' own convictions" (Bartels, 2016) . Using US data, Bartels shows a surprising lack of responsiveness of candidates' positioning to the views of swing voters.
1 Rather than rejecting the workhorse model, in this article I investigate the impact of introducing such idealist candidates into the baseline framework. Specifically, I suppose that in addition to the usual strategic candidates, there are two idealist candidates, who are fixed to their policy platforms. My first result establishes that for equilibria to exist (within the class of single-peaked distributions), these idealists must indeed be extremists i.e., occupy left-most and right-most positions. Osborne (1993) shows the negative result that the workhorse model, allowing for endogenous entry with N > 2 strategic candidates who maximize their plurality, fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies for all single-peaked distributions of voter ideal points except for some pathological cases. These cases constitute a degenerate class of distributions including the uniform, which significantly weakened the results of previous studies that employed such distributions e.g., Cox (1987, Theorem 2) . In this article, I show that the introduction of idealist candidates restores the existence of pure strategy equilibria for a non-degenerate set of 1 He also shows that the data are not consistent with the hypothesis that candidate positions are a compromise between the locations of the relevant party's base and swing voters because candidates' positions tend to be even more extreme than the base.
single-peaked distributions, and provide a characterization thereof. 2 Moreover, this is done in a setting where the number of potential entrants is unlimited, i.e., N = ∞.
Platform-sharing is not an attractive prediction for empiricists. The second result I present says that in almost any equilibrium, it must be that there is exactly one strategic candidate at any occupied policy platform. Combined with the fact that strategic candidates who enter tie, this implies that their positions are spaced evenly throughout the distribution of voter preferences.
This maximal differentiation of candidate positions in equilibrium shows that in this setup, the prediction of platform-sharing is strongly rejected.
For symmetric distributions of voter ideal points I find a unique equilibrium in which one strategic candidate enters and wins the election outright, when the idealists are not too extreme or too moderate relative to the distribution of voter preferences. I then show that if an equilibrium features multiple strategic entrants then the distribution of voter ideal points is asymmetric, but that the converse is not true. I provide a characterization for equilibria under asymmetric single-peaked distributions. I also give examples of equilibria for various symmetric and asymmetric distributions. The main analysis is done with two idealist candidates. In the final section, I illustrate that equilibria are robust under the more general assumption that both ends of the political spectrum are populated with multiple idealist candidates, or 'idealist fringes'.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews some relevant literature; Section 3 presents the model; Section 4 provides and discusses the main results; Section 5 introduces idealist fringes; Section 6 concludes.
Literature
Other researchers have also proposed variations of the canonical model in which a pure strategy equilibrium obtains when N > 2. 3 Palfrey (1984) studies N = 3 and shows that two parties locate at distinct locations to keep an entrant at bay, although the analysis quickly becomes intractable for higher N (see his Remark 1). Osborne (1993) defines a dynamic version of the model, and offers results for N = 3 (and partial results for N = 4, 5) showing, among 2 I study pure equilibria in this article and hereon refer to these simply as 'equilibria'. other findings, that there is always an equilibrium in which N − 2 candidates enter and locate at the median. Xefteris (2016) shows that when one allows for each voter to cast k ≥ 2 votes each instead of just k = 1, then equilibrium exists for a non-degenerate class of distributions where there are at least k + 1 candidates at every location. In contrast, I offer results in a plurality voting system (common to many countries e.g., United States, Canada, India and United Kingdom) where the number of potential strategic candidates, who may choose whether to enter in equilibrium, is unlimited i.e., N = ∞.
My model assumes the existence of idealistic candidates, not specifying the origin of their conviction. 4 One approach that shares the feature that candidates are fixed to their platforms envisages candidates as members of the electorate who are assumed to be committed to imposing their own ideological stance, termed 'citizen-candidates ' (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) . These approaches are undoubtedly deeper than the analysis in the baseline Hotelling-Downs model through their endogenization of the origin of candidates. Also related is the differentiated candidates framework of Krasa and Polborn (2012, 2014) which also allows for a multi-dimensional policy space but assumes the positions of two candidates are fixed in some dimensions, while flexible in others. In contrast, the model of this article sticks closely to the canonical framework which in turn implies a reduction in richness. However, my model does manage the coexistence of both ideological candidates (who stick to their positions) and strategic candidates (who could be interpreted as career politicians, with the sole desire to gain office). The model also offers features that meet with some basic observations concerning elections e.g., platform differentiation, multiple candidates, asymmetric voter-preference distributions.
Model
The model setup stays close to the canonical Hotelling-Downs model, generalizing it by allowing for endogenous entry, an unlimited number of candidates, and a reasonable objective function for strategic candidates as in Osborne (1993) . The policy space is represented by some interval X ⊆ R. The ideal policies of voters are spread out along X by an atomless distribution function F which is assumed continuous, guaranteeing it has a density, f , which may be asymmetric. Voters are assumed to be sincere and to have symmetric preferences around their ideal points, meaning that they vote for the candidate positioned closest to that point. If there are multiple candidates at a position, each of these candidates receives an equal share of the votes from the voters for whom that position is closest. There is an unlimited number of strategic candidates (i.e., N = ∞) and two idealist candidates. Idealist candidates always enter and occupy positions denoted z 1 , z 2 ∈ X where z 1 < z 2 . 5 Strategic candidates each have the action set X ∪ {out} i.e., they either enter and choose a policy platform denoted x i , or they choose not to enter the race. The number of strategic candidates choosing to enter the race is denoted n and the vector of positions chosen, x. Candidates who do not enter are referred to as inactive. 
An oft-used objective function for candidates is that of vote maximization. However, vote maximization is not a reasonable objective function for candidates when N > 2, as it is incompatible with preferences in which winning an election is preferred to losing it (Osborne, 1995, p.280 x A and loses under x B . Plurality maximization does not suffer this criticism, saying that candidates prefer to: (1) win (or tie for the win) than to lose; (2) stay out than lose; and (3) win outright by wider margins. In addition, it is assumed that candidates prefer to win (outright or tie) than {out}, but prefer {out} to entering and losing. 5 Although z 1 and z 2 refer to locations, sometimes I also call the idealists z 1 and z 2 .
There are r + 1 ≤ n + 2 occupied positions denoted y 0 , . . . , y r indexed without loss of generality such that y 0 < · · · < y r . The midpoint of two locations y j and y j+1 is denoted
The total number of candidates located at y j is denoted k j (regardless of whether the candidate(s) are idealistic or strategic). The constituency of a position y j is the share of voters that vote for one of the candidates at y j . The left (right) constituency of y j denotes the mass of voters voting for a candidate at y j who have ideal points to the left (right)
where F (m −1 ) ≡ 0 and F (m r ) ≡ 1.
Results
I first present necessary conditions for an equilibrium to exist for almost any single-peaked density f . These include the results that idealists must be the extreme candidates and that plat- Proposition 1 (Extreme idealism). For almost any single-peaked f : y 0 = z 1 , y r = z 2 and
Proposition 1 reveals that the left-most and right-most (i.e., extreme) positions must be occupied by idealists for an equilibrium to exist for almost any single-peaked f . In analysis with only strategic candidates, it must be that k 0 = k r = 2 and therefore that L 0 = R 0 and L r = R r (Lemma A1, b and c) which are so restrictive that they preclude equilibrium in all but very special cases of F (Osborne, 1993) . In contrast, when extreme positions are occupied by candidates who are void of strategic concerns these requirements do not arise. This gives rise to Proposition 1: in any equilibrium, extremists must be idealists.
Proposition 2 (No platform sharing). For almost any single-peaked f , k j = 1 for all j when n ≥ 2 in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 dealt with the extreme locations. Proposition 2 deals with the intermediate positions and shows that these also cannot generally hold two strategic candidates in equilib-rium. Due to the endogenous entry decision all strategic candidates who enter, tie in equilibrium (Lemma A1, d). Together with Proposition 2 this implies that a necessary condition of equilibrium is that the strategic candidates are spaced evenly throughout the distribution of voter preferences. In contrast, the hypothesis of convergence stipulates that candidates are incentivized to converge upon shared locations. The separation of candidates' equilibrium positions here shows this can fail, irrespective of the number of strategic entrants.
The results of Propositions 1 and 2 lay the groundwork for the equilibrium characterizations. Proposition 3 provides the conditions for which there is a unique equilibrium for symmetric single-peaked distributions of voter ideal points.
Proposition 3 (Symmetric distributions). For almost any symmetric, single-peaked f , there is a unique equilibrium where n = 1 strategic candidate enters at location y 1 , where y 1 solves (1):
, whenever the positions of the idealists (z 1 , z 2 )
satisfy (2) and (3):
Except for single-peakedness, the conditions of Proposition 3 deliver equilibrium existence without other restrictions on the shape of f . Condition (1) is implied by the requirement that the idealists' vote-shares must be equal in equilibrium (Lemma A6: if not, then due to symmetry the strategic candidate could profitably deviate by moving slightly towards the idealist with the higher vote share). Conditions (2)- (3) 
Left panel: Differentiable f with unbounded support (Standard Normal); idealists at percentiles 20 and 85. One strategic candidate enters at y 1 which is percentile 46, and obtains a vote share of 0.36. The idealists' vote shares are both 0.32.
Right panel: Non-differentiable f with bounded support (triangular distribution); idealists at percentiles 10 and 80. One strategic candidate enters at y 1 which is percentile 59, and obtains a vote share of 0.41. The idealists' vote shares are both 0.30.
Hollow (filled) circles represent the location of idealist (strategic) candidates. Shaded (unshaded) areas are the constituencies of the winning (losing) candidate.
A feature of Proposition 3 is that with symmetric single-peaked densities, only one strategic candidate enters in equilibrium. In Corollary 1, I show that this feature is not special to symmetry per se: it will hold in equilibrium for almost any single-peaked distribution where the mode (Mo) equals the median (Md).
Corollary 1. For almost any single-peaked f where Mo(f ) = Md(f ), n = 1.
To understand the result, suppose instead that n > 1. This implies that exactly one idealist loses (Lemma A4). Further, there cannot be more than one strategic candidate with any of their constituency on the same side of the mode as the losing idealist (else the candidate closest to the losing idealist could profitably deviate by moving slightly towards the mode). There is then be at least one strategic candidate with their whole constituency on the same side of the mode as the idealist who ties for the win. However, for these candidates to win, there must be more than half of the probability density on that side of the mode, contradicting Mo(f ) = Md(f ).
I now characterize equilibria where n > 1 strategic candidates enter. By Corollary 1
we know that distributions of voter preferences that support such equilibria are such that Mo(f ) = Md(f ), and hence are asymmetric. Furthermore, the simple fact of whether the median or the mode of f is greater will play a role in determining equilibria. Proposition 4
provides conditions for an equilibrium to exist for asymmetric single-peaked distributions of voter preferences where Mo(f ) = Md(f ). Figure 2 gives two examples.
Proposition 4 (Asymmetric distributions).
For almost any asymmetric, single-peaked f satisfying (4) - (6) where Mo(f ) = Md(f ), there is an equilibrium with n > 1 strategic candidates where locations and vote-shares are given by Lemma A7.
Compared to the symmetric case, there are more equilibrium conditions when n > 1.
Lemma A7 provides conditions (A6) and (A9) which are analogous to condition (2) of Proposition 3 which say the losing idealist must be extreme enough to lose. The Lemma also provides the exact equilibrium location of strategic candidates (conditions A4, A5, A7, A8) which as Proposition 2 revealed, are spaced out evenly through the distribution of voter ideal points.
Specifically, the locations of the idealist candidates pin down the vote share, s * , enjoyed by each of the strategic candidates in equilibrium. The strategic candidates' locations are then determined by a 'spacing procedure' (detailed in precisely in Lemma A5). To illustrate, suppose that z 1 ties for the win (which is the case if Mo(f ) < Md(f )); then place the first strategic candidate at y 1 , such that z 1 has a vote share of s * ; then place the second strategic candidate at y 2 , such that the candidate at y 1 has a vote share of s * , and so on; the losing idealist, in this case z 2 , will then be left with the residual vote share of 1 − s(n + 1).
For equilibria with n > 1, there are also conditions concerning the shape of f , given by (4)- (6) . The requirement of (4) and (5) that f (m j−1 ) ≤ 2f (m j ) for j = 1, . . . , n is driven by the fact that strategic candidates are plurality maximizers. To see this, consider the candidate at y 2 in the top panel of Figure 2 , and a deviation slightly to the left. This reduces the vote share of the candidate at y 1 , but raises that of z 2 . The marginal gain in plurality is f (m 1 ), but the marginal loss is 2f (m 2 ): f (m 2 ) for the loss in vote share and another f (m 2 ) for the gain in vote share of z 2 . Therefore, if f (m 1 ) > 2f (m 2 ) there would be such a deviation. Condition (6) requires that the density of the midpoint between the losing extremist and their neighboring strategic candidate not be higher than the density of both of those candidate's locations.
The condition precludes the possibility that there could be a profitable deviation for an inactive candidate to enter. All conditions are met by the examples in Figure 2 which are therefore equilibria with asymmetric, single-peaked distributions of voter preferences.
Idealist fringes
The preceding analysis assumed the existence of two idealist candidates which kept the analysis more tractable. However, the model can be extended beyond the two-idealist set-up.
Here, I show equilibria can accommodate multiple idealist candidates at the extremes of the political spectrum, which I term 'idealist fringes'. Their introduction requires minor re-workings of the equilibrium conditions derived previously. In Figure 3 I augment examples from Figures 1-2 to incorporate idealist fringes.
Here, I contrast the equilibria shown in Figure 3 relative to the corresponding panels of Figures 1-2. In the symmetric example where f is the Standard Normal, the equilibrium location of strategic candidate y 1 is such that the adjacent idealists z 1 and z 2 tie for second place. This is the analog of condition (1) of Proposition 3 and similarly it ensures the strategic candidate does not want to deviate within their constituency. Proposition 3's conditions (2) and (3) are also 
Top panel: f is the Log-Normal distribution ln N(0, 0.5); idealists at percentiles 5 and 80. Two strategic candidates enter at y 1 and y 2 which are percentiles 23 and 58 respectively, and both obtain a vote share of 0.29. The idealists z 1 and z 2 obtain vote shares 0.13 and 0.29 respectively.
Bottom panel: f is the Linear distribution; idealists at percentiles 7 and 100. Seven strategic candidates enter at y 1 , . . . , y 7 which respectively are percentiles (17, 30, 40, 53, 63, 77, 86) , and all obtain a vote share of 0.116. The idealists z 1 and z 2 obtain vote shares 0.116 and 0.07 respectively.
Hollow (filled) circles represent the location of idealist (strategic) candidates. Shaded (unshaded) areas are the constituencies of the winning (losing) candidates.
reflected respectively by the facts that the idealists are located such that the strategic candidate wins and that inactive strategic candidates prefer not to enter. Introducing any additional number of idealist candidates to the fringes such that they do not change the vote share of z 1 or z 2
will not alter the equilibrium beyond changing the vote shares of those in the fringes (e.g., the idealists shown at percentiles 0.5, 97 and 98). In the asymmetric example, the equilibrium locations of the strategic candidates is recalculated to ensure that y 1 , y 2 and z 2 all tie for the win.
A recalculation is necessary because the introduction of the idealist to the right of z 2 reduced z 2 's constituency. The idealists introduced to the left of z 1 have no effect on the equilibrium other than changing the vote shares of the idealists in the left fringe (e.g., the idealists shown at percentiles 0 and 0.1). Similarly, introducing idealists to the right of the far-right idealist candidate would also have no effect on the equilibrium except altering the vote shares among the right fringe. The positions depicted also satisfy conditions (4)- (6) of Proposition 4 and so constitute an equilibrium.
Figure 3: Equilibrium with idealist fringes 
Conclusion
This article analyzed a variant of the canonical Hotelling-Downs model which features idealist candidates in addition to the standard strategic candidates. In doing so, I found that equi-libria exist for a non-degenerate set of distributions of voter preferences, while allowing for an unlimited number of potential entrants. The model makes a number of predictions. Those more straight forward are that (for almost any single-peaked distribution of voter preferences): i) extreme candidates will tend to be ideologically fixed to their platform and that ii) strategic candidates locate on distinct policy platforms. Other predictions include a relationship between the mode and median of f as a determinant of the number of candidates entering in equilibrium:
If there are multiple strategic candidates, the distribution of voter preferences is such that the mode and median are distinct. Conversely, if the distribution of voter preferences is symmetric, one strategic candidate will run and win. A binary comparison between mode and median cannot of course capture all the ways in which distributions can be asymmetric, but nevertheless acts as a succinct predictive measure in plurality voting systems with idealist candidates.
Finally, I showed how equilibria can accommodate 'idealist fringes' where multiple idealistic candidates populate the extremes of the political spectrum.
Lemma A1. When at least one strategic type is at y j :
(d) All strategic candidates who enter, tie and win.
Proof: When all candidates at a given location are strategic, the proofs are identical to Cox . If k 1 = 2, then y 1 = F −1 3 n+2 which implies
, which is not satisfied for almost any distribution. Continuing similarly, one shows that generically, k j = 1 for all j > 1 (see the proof of Lemma 2 in Osborne (1993) which up to this point, I have presented an adapted version of). It must be therefore that r = n and y r = z 2 . For all candidates to tie, m j = F −1 j+2 n+2 for j = 0, . . . , n − 1.
Solving recursively yields y
. However, we also re-
. These two expressions are not satisfied simultaneously for almost any distribution. Now consider the case where there is one candidate at each extreme location k 0 = k r = 1, which by Lemma A1 implies y 0 = z 1 and y r = z 2 . For all to tie, F (m j ) = F (m j−1 )+s j for j = 0, . . . , r−1 where s j = k j n+2
. Solving recursively yields z 1 = (−1) r z 2 +2 r−1
where S j = j i=1 s i which is not true for almost any F .
Proposition 1 (Extreme idealism).
For almost any single-peaked f : y 0 = z 1 , y r = z 2 and k 0 = k r = 1 in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose not. Either k 0 = 2 or k r = 2 by Lemma A1 (b). Without loss of generality say k 0 = 2, which implies L 0 = R 0 by Lemma A1 (c). Denote the equilibrium vote share of the winning candidates by s.
, which is not true for almost any F .
If n = 2, s ≥ , then by Lemma A1 (d), z 2 is the sole loser. It must be that the strategic candidate is located at y 1 < z 2 :
if they were located at z 2 , then they would tie with z 2 ; if they were located right of z 2 , they could profitably deviate slightly to the left. If f (m 0 ) > f (m 1 ), then the candidate at y 1 can profitably deviate by moving slightly to the left (they increase their share, and decrease the shares of can-
hence the candidate at y 1 must get strictly more than s votes and wins outright, a contradiction.
For n ≥ 3 strategic candidates, y 0 = F −1 (s) and m 0 = F −1 (2s). If there is a strategic candidate at y 1 and k 1 = 2, then y 1 = F −1 (3s) which implies
which is true for almost no distribution F . Hence k 1 = 1 and m 1 = F −1 (3s). Similarly, if there is a strategic candidate at y 2 , k 2 = 1 for almost any F , and so on. Denote y l as the left-most position after y 0 where there is an idealist. What I have shown so far is that for almost any F , k l = 1. Now I consider two cases, both of which end in a contradiction. (Recall that by Lemma A1 (d) and Lemma A2, z 2 must lose for almost all F .) (i) If there are no strategic candidates to the right of y l , then for the single-peaked density
, then the candidate at y l has a profitable deviation slightly to the left (by increasing their own vote share and decreasing that of the winning candidates).
(ii) If there is a strategic candidate to the right of y l , let the right-most such candidate be at
consider two sub-cases: If j = r, then k r = 2 and R r = L r = s < R r−1 . If j < r, then j = r − 1 and there is a lone idealist at y r , in which case y j can deviate profitably by moving slightly to the left (by increasing their own vote share and decreasing that of the winning candidates).
Lemma A3. For almost any distribution F , k j = 1 for all j when n = 2.
Proof: Suppose not. Then by Proposition 1 and Lemma A1 (c), k 1 = 2 and L 1 = R 1 . If z 1 gets a strictly lower (higher) vote share than z 2 , an entrant can locate slightly to the right (left) of the strategic candidates at y 1 and win outright. Thus all candidates tie, contradicting Lemma A2.
Lemma A4. For almost any single-peaked f , exactly one idealist must tie with the strategic candidates when n ≥ 2.
Proof: First, I show that it cannot be that both idealists lose. Suppose they do and consider first n = 2. By Lemma A3,
, the candidate at y 1 can move slightly to the right, increasing their vote-share and decreasing that of the other strategic candidate; if is weakly to the left of the maximizer of f , then k 1 = 1 because if k 1 = 2, s = R 1 < L 2 , which contradicts Lemma A1 (d). Because k 1 = 1 and z 1 loses, the candidate at y 1 can profitably deviate slightly to the right. Now consider the case where y 2 is to the right of the maximizer.
There can be no more strategic candidates to the right of y 2 . If there were, then k j = 1, j > 2 because if k j = 2 for one such j, then R j−1 > L j = s. Note now that the candidate at y r−1 has a profitable deviation to the left because z 2 loses. Next I show that it must be that k 1 = k 2 = 2 and hence that n = 4. If k 2 = 1 and f (m 1 ) > f (m 2 ), the candidate at y 2 can profitably deviate to the left; if k 2 = 1 and f (m 1 ) ≤ f (m 2 ), k 1 = 1 (else s = R 1 < L 2 ) and the candidate at y 1 can profitably deviate right. Hence k 2 = 2. If k 1 = 1 and f (m 0 ) < f (m 1 ), the candidate at y 1 can profitably deviate right; if
But with only two free variables (y 1 and y 2 ) these three conditions will not be satisfied for almost any F .
Hence, for almost all single-peaked distributions at least one idealist must tie, but by Lemma A2, exactly one idealist must tie.
Lemma A5. For almost any single-peaked f , k j = 1 for all j when n ≥ 3.
Proof: By Proposition 1, y 0 = z 1 and y r = z 2 while by Lemma A1 (d) all strategic entrants tie for the win. This implies F (z 1 ) < 1 n+2 and F (z 2 ) > n+1 n+2 in any equilibrium. By Lemma A4, exactly one idealist ties with the strategic types and without loss of generality, let this be z 1 . Now consider the following spacing procedure which spaces candidate locations throughout the distribution F for some arbitrary number of candidates n, where k 0 = k r = 2, k j = 1, 2 for j = 1, . . . , r − 1 and strategic types tie with the idealist z 1 .
Spacing Procedure:
2. Place the remaining r − 2 candidate locations at y j for j = 2, ..., r − 1 in turn, such that (y r−1 + z 2 ) return to step 1 and choose a higher (lower) value of s.
Observe whether
Iterating on this procedure, the value of s will converge to s * . As F is continuous, s * exists, and as F is strictly increasing, s * is unique. An example result of the procedure is illustrated below in Figure A1 . The points y 1 , . . . , y r−1 associated with s * pin-down the necessary locations of the strategic candidates in equilibrium.
7
It is now straightforward to see that for almost any distribution F , k i = 1 for all i. Suppose instead that k j = 2 for some j = 2, ..., r. By Lemma A1 (c) we must have that L j = R j .
However, as is illustrated in Figure A1 for the example of j = 2, this extra condition will not be satisfied for all except very particular distributions.
7 Notice that although s * is necessarily the equilibrium share of the vote for the winning candidates, this procedure is not sufficient to define an equilibrium as for example, it may not be that y j > y j−1 for all j = 1, ..., r − 1. Figure A1 : An example result of the spacing procedure
The example shown has n = 4 and r = 4 where k i = 1 for all i except k 2 = 2. F is the standard Normal distribution and z 1 = F −1 (0.10), z 2 = F −1 (0.98). Solving the procedure yields s * = 0.19 (2 d.p.) with candidate positions as shown.
Proof: Immediate from Lemmas A3 and A5.
Lemma A6. For any symmetric, single-peaked f , when there is n = 1 strategic entrant, the idealists' vote shares are equal.
Proof: Suppose not. Without loss of generality, suppose that the idealist z 1 has a higher vote share than z 2 which implies that f (m 0 ) > f (m 1 ). The strategic candidate at y 1 can move slightly to the left, simultaneously increasing their own vote share and reducing the vote share of z 1 , giving strictly higher utility.
( Proof: Firstly I show that n = 1 in equilibrium. Suppose instead n > 1. By Proposition 1 and Lemmas A3 and A5, for almost all single-peaked f , the strategic candidates occupy the nonextreme locations and k j = 1 for all j. As f is symmetric, there must be at least one strategic candidate on either side of the maximizer of f , else Lemma A1 (d) is violated. I now show this implies that both idealists tie with the strategic candidates. Suppose not and without loss of generality that z 1 loses. As f is symmetric, this implies f (m 0 ) < f (m 1 ) (if not, z 1 gets at least as many votes as the candidate at y 2 ). The candidate at y 1 then can profitably deviate slightly to the right. But by Lemma A2 for almost all distributions F , not all candidates can tie.
I now characterize the equilibrium. By Lemma A6, the idealists' vote shares must be equal, meaning that the strategic candidate's position y 1 must solve (1). To be an equilibrium, the strategic candidate must win, which implies F (m 1 ) − F (m 0 ) > . Using (1), this becomes (2).
In equilibrium, the strategic candidate must not want to deviate to the left of z 1 or the right of z 2 . Note that (2) implies that z 1 < F −1 (
) and z 2 > F −1 ( whose position is has higher density, y j . But this cannot be profitable because the maximum vote share is bounded from above by max{L j , R j } < s * ; (iv) between z 1 and y 1 , which contains the maximizer of f : under (6) , the optimal such deviation is to locate arbitrarily close to z 1 or y 1 (whichever has the higher density), but as in case (iii) this is unprofitable because max{R 0 , L 1 } < s * .
Finally, for deviations of the candidate at y j to locations outside the interval (y j−1 , y j+1 ), j = 1, . . . , n, it suffices to follow the steps above relating to an inactive candidate.
